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With the clamor rising over airport delays and with both the Congress and the 
Administration considering remedies, this paper advocates the use of market 
mechanisms, specifically slot auctions, to promote efficient usage of airport 
capacity, reduce airport delays, and, more generally, promote competition. 
  
I.  Introduction and Overview 
  As highlighted in recent news articles, airport delays are increasing, significantly so, 
and both the Administration and the Congress are actively seeking ways to reduce the scope 
of the problem and to better protect the rights of passengers in case of delays.
1 Airport delays 
occur because airport capacity (e.g. runways and gates) is a scarce resource and, at key 
airports, airlines are scheduling more flights than that capacity can support. As a result, more 
and more flights are delayed, even under normal weather conditions, and considerable costs 
are imposed on the traveling public. Passengers are paying, in effect, a much higher total price 
than the dollar price of their tickets. Solutions for ameliorating an increasingly untenable 
situation are needed, especially as more airports are forecast to be capacity constrained in the 
near future. In this short paper, we explain how to rely on market mechanisms to better 
allocate existing airport capacity, to lessen delays, and to help finance capacity expansions 
whose projected benefits justify their costs. 
 
  Airlines’ private incentives to schedule flights to serve more destinations and offer 
passengers more choice in departure times do not take into account the delays that their own 
flights impose upon other airlines because airlines do not face the proper price incentives to 
use scarce airport capacity. Consequently, airlines schedule too many flights, generating 
delays that ripple across the highly integrated airline network and adversely affect all 
passengers. One approach to solving this problem might be to get the airlines together and 
have them collectively hammer out a solution. This would, however, require the airlines to 
make individually costly compromises on a multitude of scheduling decisions, and each 
airline would in the end agree to abide by a settlement only if it left it better off than not 
agreeing. Such collective decision-making would not necessarily benefit consumers. Indeed, 
collective decision-making by actual and potential rivals raises serious risks to competition.  
 
Other proposed solutions to the airport delay problem seem to have a common theme: 
eliminate the problem by expanding the airports and improving the air traffic control systems 
to, in effect, eliminate the capacity scarcity. For example, currently popular proposals include 
the spending of billions of dollars to add runways and expand other physical capacity (such as 
gates) at airports to accommodate more concurrent flight operations, and to improve air traffic 
control systems to allow for more intensive usage of existing capacity (by, e.g., shortening the 
distance between aircraft in airspace). These methods of dealing with the problem are, as their 
price tags indicate, costly, providing a prime illustration of the economic axiom “There is no 
                                                 
1 See The Wall Street Journal (“Small Jets, More Trips Worsen Airport Delays” 8-13-07), The New York Times 
(“Ugly Airline Math: Planes Late, Fliers Even Later” 7-5-2007, “Push For Action On Flight Delays” 9-28-2007), 
for recent articles on rising airport delays.   2  
 
 
such thing as a free lunch.”
2 Moreover, plans to expand capacity will not even under the most 
optimistic projections ameliorate the problem of delays in anything but the very long term. 
 
  We propose a complementary approach, one that uses basic economic and market 
principles to help allocate existing scarce assets more efficiently. Only by allocating existing 
assets efficiently can society squeeze the greatest possible value out of its scarce resources. 
Moreover, failure to do so may well result in capacity expansion plans whose costs do not 
justify their benefits. In brief, we advocate a market-based approach to the allocation of scarce 
takeoff and landing rights at airports where the demand for those rights at a zero price exceeds 
the ability of the airport to handle that many takeoffs and landings during some time period.
3  
 
Under our proposal, the FAA and airport authority would determine the number of 
takeoffs and landings that an airport can safely accommodate in each time period given its 
current design (e.g. runway layout) and the airside requirements (on, e.g., optimal spacing 
between aircraft).
4 Property rights to use these scarce takeoff and landing resources should 
then be auctioned off to those willing to pay the most for them. Acquirers should have clear 
ownership rights to retain the slots for some predetermined length of time, or to sell or lease 
them in secondary markets. This process would foster competition for airport access rights 
and help ensure that they are allocated to their highest valued uses, efficiently rationing 
demand, reducing delays, and benefiting society. And to the extent that competitive concerns 
are raised by, for example, individual airlines attempting to purchase too many of these rights 
at particular airports, antitrust authorities can step in where appropriate to block such 
purchases.   
 
Key to this process is the reliance on competitive market mechanisms to efficiently 
allocate airport resources. Although the airline industry has unique features, these features do 
not justify reliance on non-market mechanisms to ration airport access. Airlines urging the 
continued use of non-market mechanisms have an incentive to do so in order to benefit 
                                                 
2 For example, in August of this year, the FAA award a $1.86 billion contract for the initial stage of deploying 
and operating a GPS tracking system to replace the current use of radar. 
3 We are not alone in the call for a market-based mechanism to allocate airport capacity. Among others, The 
National Center of Excellence for Aviation Operations Research (NEXTOR) has investigated market 
mechanisms to allocate scarce airport capacity, and legislation pending before Congress similarly calls for a 
market-based solution. 
4 We assume for this paper that these requirements are known, though in fact, they should also be a subject for 
analysis. Moreover, we note that the “right” number of slots may be less than the maximum the airport could 
accommodate under ideal conditions if the number of slots is chosen in advance. Determining the “right” 
number, which we do not analyze, is itself amenable to economic analysis. See, for example Carlton (1977), 
Visscher (1973), Panzar and Sibley (1978), Brown and Johnson (1969), and Wilson (1989). The number of slots 
could also be allowed to vary by weather, for example. Here, we envision the number of slots being set in 
advance, and below we discuss a priority slot allocation program to help deal with changing conditions from day 
to day.   3  
 
 
themselves at the expense of their rivals—and of the traveling public. It is well understood 
that firms that benefit from the legislative creation of non-market mechanisms can often be 
counted on to support the perpetuation of  the non-market mechanisms. An important 
component of our proposal is, therefore, the elimination of existing “carve-outs” by airport 
authorities and the FAA for, in particular, corporate jets and other general aviation users. To 
the extent that these entities value scarce airport capacity highly, they can demonstrate this by 
outbidding others for the right to use it. If they are unwilling to do so, these scarce assets 
should go instead to larger commercial aircraft carrying greater numbers of travelers. 
Requiring by administrative fiat that small commercial aircraft occupy scarce and valuable 
assets is highly inefficient.  
 
We also recommend that the property rights to slots include a cancellation priority in 
the event that inevitable weather-related or other delays temporarily reduce the number of 
flight operations that airports can support. This could perhaps be accomplished by assigning a 
different priority to slots within each time period, so that they would be cancelled in order of 
their priority in case of weather or other problems. Airlines could thus choose to pay a 
premium to acquire slots that are less likely to be cancelled, and they could advertise this high 
priority service to customers who value a lower probability of delay. By permitting travelers 
for whom delays would be most costly to, in effect, “buy priority,” such market-based 
approaches could perhaps squeeze yet more value out of our scarce airline industry resources. 
 
Lastly, and significantly, rather than granting valuable rights to airport access at no 
charge, as has been done in the past, slot auctions would generate revenues for the FAA and 
airport authorities that could be used to fund the expansion of airport facilities when demand 
conditions make it efficient to do so, along with improvements in air traffic control systems. 
The auctioning off of scarce resources to obtain financing for expansion from those who 
themselves consume the scarce resources, whose demands create the delay problems, and who 
ultimately stand to benefit from efficient levels of capacity, is hardly a novel concept. And 
auctions have been successfully used already by other regulatory agencies to efficiently 
allocate valuable public assets.
5 The implementation of such a market-based concept to the 




                                                 
5 The Federal Communication Commission has, for example, auctioned licenses for the use of electromagnetic 
spectrum (see, e.g., Cramton 1997); the U.S. Forest Service has used auctions to sell harvesting rights to timber 
tracts (see, e.g., Haile 2001); the Department of the Interior has used auctions to lease rights to U.S. offshore oil 
and gas drilling (see, e.g., Porter 1995); and many European countries have used auctions to allocate “third 
generation” (3G) mobile telecommunication spectrum licenses (see, e.g., Binmore and Klemperer 2002).   4  
 
 
II.  Delays Have Risen As More Flights Are Scheduled At Capacity Constrained 
Airports. 
 
The rising number of delays has not only been widely reported in the popular press, it 
is easily confirmed by viewing delay statistics collected by the Department of 
Transportation’s Bureau of Transport Statistics (BTS). In July 2007, for example, the BTS 
reports that 30% of the flights in the U.S. domestic market arrived late, up from 20% in July 
2003. And these system-wide averages obscure the fact that performance at the most capacity 
constrained of our airports is significantly worse: At JFK, for example, 43% of the arrivals 
were late in July 2007 while at LaGuardia 40% were late.  
 
This rise in delays, not surprisingly, correlates with a significant increase in the 
number of flights across the U.S. Currently, no efficient constraint is imposed on the number 
of flights that can be scheduled at a given time at an airport where scheduled flights would 
exceed the maximum number the FAA would allow for safety reasons.  In fact, at heavily 
demanded airports, as explained in more detail below, either no mechanism is being used to 
ration demand or the rationing mechanism has allocated too many landings and takeoffs.  
 
Some of the recent increase in the number of flights is due to rising demand for air 
travel, but the vast majority is coming from substitution away from large aircraft in favor of 
more frequent operations of small planes, regional jets in particular.
6 Graph 1 illustrates this 
point, showing that the number of departures has skyrocketed by 35% in recent years while 
the total number of seats has risen by less than 6%.  This implies that the number of seats per 
aircraft has declined dramatically. At some airports, and especially at those airports reporting 
the most delays, this effect is quite pronounced. At LaGuardia, for example, the average 
number of seats per aircraft was 143 in the first quarter of 1998, but had fallen to 94 as of the 
first quarter of 2007. At O’Hare, the average number of seats has fallen from 124 to 98 over 
the same period.   
 
The shift to regional jets can benefit passengers, as it gives them more opportunities to 
find flights close to their preferred flying time, and more options should a flight be cancelled. 
The airlines have also used bankruptcy proceedings to renegotiate pilot contracts, which had 
traditionally limited the use of smaller aircraft.
7  All of these additional small aircraft require 
                                                 
6 Airlines have used regional jets primarily in two ways. First, they have been deployed in densely traveled 
routes to boost frequencies where, for example, 2 50-seat regional jets might replace a Boeing 737, lowering 
total seat capacity but doubling the number of frequencies. Second, regional jets have been deployed in routes 
outside of the airline’s hub-and-spoke network to offer nonstop, point-to-point service. 
7 To be sure, there are benefits to using regional jets rather than larger aircraft. However, as discussed below, 
with individual airlines not being forced under the current system to bear the full costs of their plane size   5  
 
 
the same access to the same scarce airport facilities and air traffic network as do larger 
aircraft.
8 Hence, as more flights are scheduled into a capacity constrained air traffic system, 
delays rise. Problems are exacerbated whenever bad weather occurs, as delays at almost any 




























































































Graph 1. Growth of Seats and Flights
 
 
III.  The Extent and Seriousness of Delays Are Likely Underestimated.  
 
As troubling as the statistics on delay are, they likely understate the extent of the 
problem.  Because the BTS defines a late arrival as one landing 15 minutes past its scheduled 
arrival time, airlines can reduce reported delays simply by increasing the scheduled time of 
the flight.  And, indeed, evidence confirms that airlines have done exactly this.
9 In Table 1, 
we list the average scheduled travel time of a common aircraft type in June 1998 and June 
2007 for service originating at airports with some of the worst on-time performances in 
2007.
10 All but one of the routes we investigated saw travel times increase while on-time 
                                                                                                                                                         
decisions—in particular, with one airline not having to pay for the delay costs its decisions impose on other 
airlines—decisions on plane size are likely being skewed inefficiently. 
8 Some policy makers have suggested regulations that would limit the use of regional jets, but a great advantage 
of a market-based solution to the delay problem is that airlines will receive a signal from the price of access 
about the efficient use of capacity. This will affect their choice of equipment type: regional jet, turboprop, or 
mainline aircraft, negating the need for potentially arbitrary regulations. 
9 See, for example, Shumsky (1993), which shows that the introduction of the on-time reporting requirement in 
1987 led to longer scheduled flights. 
10 These routes were chosen because they had the worst on-time performance for 2007 through July with a 
median on-time arrival performance of 51%. Routes with fewer than 8 flights per day and those without common 
aircraft types in 1998 and 2007 were excluded.   6  
 
 
performance fell. On one of the worst performing routes, O’Hare to Newark, average 
scheduled travel time on a 737 aircraft rose by 21 minutes while delayed arrivals rose by 12 
percentage points. While it is hard to estimate the exact extent to which padding the schedules 
affects reported delays, the direction of the effect is clear: If scheduled travel times had not 






While delays are rising, and likely by more than the official statistics indicate, the 
actual cost of a delay consists of, most importantly, the opportunity cost of the time that 
delayed travelers spend on planes, in airports, and in more serious cases in hotels. To get a 
glimpse of how large these costs likely are, we use a conservative estimate of the total number 
of hours “lost” by passengers due to delays and multiply this number by an estimate of the 
value of an hour of a traveler’s time. For the first quarter of 2007, we estimated the cost of 
delays at $239 million (see the Appendix for details).  This is equivalent to the cost of one 
million one-way flights between Reagan National airport and Seattle, Washington.
11  This 
estimate is conservative, and a likely underestimate, in that it only counts delay a t the 
destination airport of a passenger’s itinerary,
12 and it omits the delay costs incurred by 
connecting passengers who miss their connections at intermediate airports and spend hours 
(or days) in airports waiting to continue their trip.  
 
                                                 
11 In the first quarter of 2007, the average fare between Reagan National and Seattle, Washington was $238.86 
on a one-way basis according to the Department of Transportation Origin and Destination Survey, DB1B. 
12 For roundtrip tickets, delays at the endpoints of each of the outbound and inbound itineraries are factored in. 
Table 1. Padding Schedules 
  Average Scheduled Travel Time (minutes)   
Origin - Destination  June 1998 June 2007
Change in 
Travel Time 
Change in % of 
Flights Delayed
Detroit – Newark  103 108 5 9%
Charlotte - Newark  112 110 -2 22%
O'Hare – Newark  125 146 21 12%
Detroit - LaGuardia  114 117 3 2%
Denver - LaGuardia  212 222 10 17%
Dallas – Newark  205 227 22 19%
Boston - Philadelphia  80 86 6 17%
Cincinnati - Newark  125 131 6 16%
Raleigh, NC - Newark  95 106 11 20%
Dallas - LaGuardia  200 211 11 20%
Minneapolis - Newark  154 169 15 1%
             
Source: OAG and BTS Delay Statistics. Travel on the second Wednesday of June in 
1998 and 2007. Travel times are compared for a common type of aircraft. Change in 
% of Flights Delayed compares January through July 1998 with 2007.   7  
 
 
Perhaps even m ore troubling than the current cost of delays is that over the next 20 
years the number of airports where demand exceeds capacity is expected to grow. FAA 
forecasts of demand for airport capacity show that even with  all planned airport 
improvements, a growing number of airports will find demand for departures and arrivals in 
excess of capacity.
13 While these forecasts show only 4 airports as being short of capacity in 
2007 (LaGuardia, O’Hare, JFK, and Newark), by 2015 between 6 and 18 airports will have 
insufficient capacity to meet demand—depending on the completion of planned 
improvements. The situation worsens by 2025, when between 14 and 27 of the busiest 
airports in the country are forecast to be short on capacity.  
 
IV.  Policies Implemented Over Time to Control Airport Delays Have Not Worked. 
 
Historically, the FAA has restricted landing and takeoff rights at four key airports. 
These airports are LaGuardia, JFK, O’Hare, and Washington’s Reagan National airport,
14 and 
they accounted in 2006 for about 64 million arriving passengers and 20% of flight departures 
and arrivals across the U.S. The High Density Rule, adopted by the FAA in 1969, imposed 
slot constraints at each of these four airports. A slot gave an airline the right to either takeoff 
or land at the airport in a specified time period, and airlines could only access the airport with 
a slot. The slot allocations were awarded at no charge by the FAA and largely went to 
incumbent airlines based on their levels of service at the time.  
 
Whether or not the initial allocation of slots in 1969 was efficient, more than 15 years 
went by before a mechanism was put in place by which airlines could reallocate slots through 
sale or temporary lease. Then, in 1985, the FAA allowed for the development of a secondary 
market for sales and leases to promote entry and competition. In theory, a secondary market 
should have allowed slots to flow to airlines that valued them most highly, thereby resulting 
in a more efficient allocation of airport capacity. Yet after an initial burst of trading, the FAA 
found that it was rare for more than a few slots to be available in the secondary market at any 
given time. While the small number of transactions is not itself proof that the secondary 
market failed, it is doubtful the result was an optimal use of airport capacity.  
 
In part because of the perceived failures of the secondary market, the FAA in the early 
1990s received statutory authority to grant exemptions from the slot rules to new entrant 
airlines, and when additional slots were periodically made available, the FAA would hand 
                                                 
13 “Capacity Needs in the National Airspace System 2007-2025. An Analysis of Airports and Metropolitan Area 
Demand and Operational Capacity in the Future,” Federal Aviation Administration, May 2007. 
14  There are local noise regulations at some airports (e.g. Burbank and Santa Ana in CA) that reduce some 
landing and takeoff activities.   8  
 
 
them out at its discretion, usually through an application process that predictably fostered 
intensive and costly lobbying efforts by parties working to convince the FAA to choose them. 
 
A lack of clear property rights could have contributed to the apparent problems with 
the secondary market. Under FAA regulations, slots are operating authorizations, not property 
rights, and the FAA retains the right to repossess them at any time. This uncertainty can 
impose substantial transaction costs because parties to a slot transaction may have to specify a 
variety of contingencies to the transaction, and it may also reduce the economic value of a slot 
(a problem not helped by the thin trading volume). The structure of the slot system may also 
have led incumbents and potential entrants to systematically value slots differently, 
preventing what would otherwise be efficient transactions. In particular, because the FAA 
gives away new slots for free from time to time to airlines with few or no slots, these airlines’ 
valuation of slots would include the possibility of getting some from the FAA in the future for 
free. In fact, in 2000 the FAA gave away for free 24 new slots at Reagan National to airlines 
with no or few slots at the airport.
15 Similarly, before JetBlue began operations it was granted 
75 slots for free at JFK to facilitate its startup.
16 The same policy that prioritizes new entrants 
or those with few slots when new slots are made available makes it very unlikely that the 
FAA will allocate new ones to incumbent airlines.
17 If incumbents, thus, are able to acquire 
additional slots only in the secondary market, their valuations of slots may be higher than 
those of new entrants.  
 
In 2000, in an attempt to promote entry and competition, Congress passed the Wendell 
H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act of the 21
st Century (“AIR-21”). AIR-21 
relaxed, and ultimately eliminated (at least temporarily), slot constraints at three of the 
airports: LaGuardia, JFK and O’Hare. As shown in Table 2, in all three cases airlines quickly 
responded to the new rules by expanding the number of flights they offered regardless of total 
airport capacity, and, not surprisingly, delay problems significantly worsened. In 2000, after 
exemptions to the slot rules were allowed at LaGuardia, the number of scheduled arrivals rose 
by 34% and on-time performance fell 28 percentage points. At O’Hare, from February 2002, 
shortly before slots were lifted, to February 2004, scheduled arrivals rose 37%, while on-time 
performance dropped 16 percentage points. At JFK, after the slot system expired in 2007, 
scheduled arrivals rose 58% and on-time performance fell 13 percentage points.  
 
 
                                                 
15 The slots were allocated as follows: American Trans Air-4, Midway Airlines-2, Midwest Express-2, Spirit 
Airlines-4, America West-6, TWA-2, Frontier-2, and National-2. 
16 See http://www.dot.gov/affairs/1999/dot13999.htm for details. 
17 In addition, if the chance of receiving new slots is perceived as being dependent on whether the incumbent has 
“given up” slots in the past by selling or leasing them, this too would impede the efficient operation of the 




Table 2. Number of Scheduled Arrivals and On-Time Performance
18
 
             
  Arrivals    On-Time %   
  Slots  No Slots  Change  Slots  No Slots  Change 
LaGuardia  10,477  14,063  34%  75%  47%  -28% 
O’Hare  25,944  35,597  37%  83%  67%  -16% 
JFK  8,037  12,680  58%  78%  65%  -13% 
             
Source: BTS Airline On-Time Performance Data and T-100 
 
At LaGuardia and O’Hare, the FAA intervened to ration demand by forcing airlines to 
reduce their number of flights, and it is considering similar action at JFK. At LaGuardia, the 
FAA chose to freeze entry and roll back service across airlines, and at O’Hare it organized 
“conferences” to secure voluntary cutbacks from all airlines operating at the airport. As a 
result, despite the official expiration of slot controls by Congress, the FAA is again 
administratively controlling airport access to LaGuardia and O’Hare. 
 
V.  Allocating Airport Capacity More Efficiently. 
 
In most markets, resources used to produce a product have prices that act as a 
rationing mechanism. Use of a resource to produce a product is less profitable to firms as its 
price rises, all else equal, and when resources are scarce and firms compete for the right to use 
them, their prices begin to be bid up. Price rises until those valuing the resource the least drop 
out, and eventually the market clears when the quantity demanded is equal to the quantity 
supplied. In this way, scarce resources are allocated by the price mechanism to their highest 
valued uses. In the airline industry though, the rationing mechanisms, if they exist at all, are 
executed through scheduling conferences or arbitrary service  suspensions. None of these 
measures is likely to promote efficient airport usage or promote competition.
19  
 
Market-based methods of allocating scarce airport resources could rely on either a 
quantity-setting mechanism or a price-setting mechanism.
20 Under a  quantity-setting 
                                                 
18 Because delays are seasonal, we restrict our comparisons to the same month in different years, before and after 
slots expired. For LaGuardia, we compare December 1999 with December 2000; for O’Hare, February 2002 
with February 2004; and for JFK, May 2006 with May 2007. 
19 Across the U.S., airports impose a weight-based fee on landings (there is no fee on takeoffs) to pay for the 
maintenance and operation of the airfield. To the extent that heavier aircraft impose more costs on the runway 
and taxiways, a weight-based fee is a sensible means of covering those costs. It, however, is not a substitute for a 
mechanism designed to reduce delays. 
20 While in principle both approaches yield the same outcome, in instances where there is uncertainty in demand 
or supply, the two mechanisms differ (see Weitzman 1974).    10  
 
 
mechanism, such as slot auctions, regulators would fix the total amount of output by creating 
slots while the prices for landings and takeoffs would be determined through a competitive 
bidding process. Under a price-setting mechanism, such as variable access fees at airports, 
regulators would set prices for landings and takeoffs that induced the “appropriate” level of 
output at the airport.
21 In the airline industry, engineering and technological factors such as 
airport design (e.g. runway configuration) and air traffic control requirements (e.g. on optimal 
aircraft spacing) largely determine the output an airport can safely support, given weather 
conditions. Since the FAA must first determine the number of slots that can be used consistent 
with safety considerations, we propose the use of slot auctions rather than access pricing to 
allocate them, although either method can in principle be used to ration demand more 
efficiently than is being done today.
22  
 
VI.  Our Proposal: A Market-Based Slot System with Well-Defined Property Rights. 
 
Our preferred method to allocate scarce airport capacity is to auction slots for landings 
and takeoffs by time of day and to convey upon their purchasers well-defined property rights. 
Unlike access pricing, which may require the airport authority to continuously adjust prices, 
slot auctions require only that the airport authority set at the outset the total number of 
takeoffs and landings that the airport can accommodate in each time period under normal 
weather conditions.
 23 This approach plays to the strengths of airport authorities and the FAA, 
who have far greater expertise in determining an airport’s capacity than they do at setting 
prices.  
 
These slots should then be auctioned off through a market-based bidding process 
where each airline decides how much it would be willing to pay for each slot.
24 The prices 
obtained for slots would reflect the degree of scarcity of capacity. The price could be close to 
zero at times of the day where capacity is great relative to demand, and it will be highest 
during periods where demand is at its greatest. Property rights would be awarded to the 
highest bidders, as long as acquisitions do not anti-competitively enhance market power. 
Prohibiting airlines from scheduling flights at times when they do not have the right to use 
                                                 
21 One could also consider imposing a fee on the airline (perhaps paid to passengers) when its flight and perhaps 
surrounding flights of others are late. Fees could be chosen to induce airlines to schedule fewer flights. 
22 The optimal market-based mechanism may depend on the costs of implementing the system and the severity of 
capacity scarcity at the airport. For example, quantity-setting might be more attractive at the most severely 
constrained airports, while price-setting might be more efficient at airports constrained only at some peak times 
or at certain times of the year. 
23 Whether the appropriate number of slots should be set at the maximum number of operations under the best 
possible weather conditions is a question worthy of study. We do not analyze that question in this paper. 
24 There is a considerable economics literature on optimal auction design (see, e.g., Klemperer 2004).    11  
 
 
one of the auctioned slots would efficiently address the problem of airport delay. Moreover, 
this market-based auction would allocate these scarce slots to their highest valued uses.
 25 
 
Slot holders should also be permitted to sell or lease slots in a secondary market. As 
service patterns and market conditions change, particular airlines may want to move some of 
their operations at slot constrained airports to different times, and the right to sell or lease 
would facilitate these types of efficient adjustments.  Having well-defined property rights 
should encourage the development of a robust secondary market for slots, helping to ensure 
that slots are allocated to their highest valued uses.
26 
 
An important component of our proposal is that general aviation users, such as 
corporate jets, be required to bid for access rights in competition with all others who wish to 
use them. Under the current system, a number of slots are reserved for general aviation 
aircraft. This number varies across airports, but it is at times relatively high compared to the 
total capacity available. At Reagan National, for example, 20 percent of slots are reserved for 
general aviation even though very few unscheduled flights can meet the security restrictions 
imposed when such flights were again permitted after October 2005.
27 At LaGuardia, just 
over 7 percent of slots are reserved for general aviation. While such special interest carve-outs 
greatly benefit some, they impose potentially substantial costs by interfering with the market’s 
ability to allocate these scarce and valuable assets to those who value them most.
28 To the 
extent that these entities value scarce airport capacity highly, they can demonstrate this by 
outbidding others for the right to use it. If they are unwilling to do so, these scarce assets 
should go instead to larger commercial aircraft carrying greater numbers of travelers.  
 
The creation of priority rights through slots auctions may be used to further improve 
the efficiency of our current system. Weather issues at almost any airport in the system 
                                                 
25 If controlling the supply of slots over time (e.g. to adjust for capacity changes) or having large numbers of 
slots immediately available for new entrants is important, some percentage of slots could be set to expire 
periodically at known dates. Upon expiration, ownership of the slots would revert to the FAA (or airport 
authority) and the slots would be re-auctioned. Auctions could be held annually, allowing a certain proportion of 
the slots, say 10% or 20%, to go up for auction each year. Analysis would be needed to determine the 
appropriate duration for the property right. 
26 At some airports, to facilitate entry and expansion, property rights to slots may have to come with access rights 
to constrained physical facilities, such as gates and counter space.  To guarantee that slot holders do get access to 
conveniently located gates and facilities, airports may need to reacquire control of these assets. Airport 
authorities at LaGuardia, for instance, have begun to actively manage and monitor gate assignments and gate 
utilizations. 
27 Government Accountability Office, "Reagan  National Airport Update on Capacity to Handle Additional 
Flights and Impact on Other Area Airports," GAO-07-352, February 2007, pp. 7-12. 
28 If individual general aviation users value slots highly but are unlikely to purchase them because of the 
unscheduled nature of their service, new businesses might arise and, for example, purchase slots and lease them 
out on a temporary basis to high-value general aviation.  Such owner-brokers might occasionally lease them also 
to scheduled airliners that have a temporary need for increased frequencies.   12  
 
 
frequently force airlines to delay or cancel flights, as the FAA temporarily limits operations to 
respond to weather conditions. When those conditions arise, not all slot holders will be able to 
exercise the right conveyed by the slot, and the reduced capacity will have to be rationed. A 
question then arises as to how most efficiently to allocate that capacity among slot holders. 
One approach would be for the property rights of each slot to include a cancellation priority in 
the event of weather-related cancellations.
29 This could be accomplished by ordering the slots 
in each time period, each with a different priority. As weather conditions required 
cancellations, slots would be cancelled in order of their priority. Airlines could thus choose to 
pay a premium to acquire slots that are less likely to be cancelled, and they would be able to 
advertise this high priority service to customers who value a lower probability of delay.
30 
Such tickets likely would command a premium. Moreover, during the delay period, the 
secondary market for slots would allow the airlines to efficiently transact slots for that day. In 
particular, an airline with a valuable departure could “buy up” to a higher priority position, 
while an airline with a priority slot but a less valuable flight on that day, could sell its priority 
position (though it could obviously not do so if it had sold its flight as a “high priority” one).
31  
 
Significantly as well, under our proposal the slot auctions would generate revenues for 
the FAA and airport authorities. One possible use for the revenues generated by slot auctions 
would be to help fund expansion projects designed to increase capacity, such as the NextGen 
satellite navigation system the FAA is constructing to improve capacity utilization of air 
space. Indeed, it is difficult to justify subsidizing airlines by granting them for free rights to 
use valuable public assets whose sale at auction could generate considerable revenue.  
 
Auctioning the use of scarce public resources is hardly a novel concept, and it has 
been used with success by other regulatory agencies, such as, for example, the Federal 
Communication Commission and U.S. Forest Service. Indeed, the FAA could use the price 
bidders are willing to pay for scarce slots as a measure of the value of adding additional 
capacity at an airport or in a metropolitan area. Rising slot prices are a sign of increasing 
scarcity, and the FAA could use these prices as an input into cost-benefit analysis for when, 
                                                 
29 Another way is to add an access charge to use a slot so that the slot conveys the option to land or takeoff and 
the access price is the cost to exercise that option. The access price might be zero when airport conditions are 
optimal but rises when weather or other conditions reduce the capacity of the airport below the total number of 
slots. 
30 Similar mechanisms are in use in other industries. In the natural gas pipeline industry, for instance, shippers 
can either buy firm capacity, granting them priority shipping rights on a pipeline, or interruptible capacity, which 
grants them temporary shipping rights and may be interrupted on short notice. A shipper with firm rights may 
decide to temporarily not exercise these rights and, to defray some of the fees otherwise associated with securing 
these rights, the shipper may offer them in a secondary market for the pipeline to sell as interruptible capacity 
(here at the discretion of the shipper with the firm rights).  
31 In one sense, this plan is not a significant departure from the current system under which airlines can give back 
the right to take off an aircraft during weather-related delays in exchange for a later time in the day. We are 
essentially proposing a formal market to allow these types of transactions between airlines.    13  
 
 
where and whether costly capacity-enhancing investments are worth the benefits they would 
provide. Taken as whole, our proposal would not only help achieve efficient usage of airport 
resources and reduce delays, but also provide signals and generate revenues for efficient 
capacity expansion. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
With the clamor rising over airport delays and the Administration and the Congress 
actively seeking ways of addressing the problem, it is time to implement an effective, market-
based solution that promotes efficient usage of airport capacity and reduces delays. In this 
paper, we have proposed implementing a market-based auction system with well-defined 
property rights to slots to allocate scarce airport capacity. Our proposal would ensure that 
airlines effectively take into account airports’ scarce resources when scheduling their flights, 
thereby reducing delays, and it would help ensure that these public resources are allocated to 
their highest valued uses. This approach strives to balance administrative costs with economic 
efficiency, as it facilitates efficient flight schedule adjustments and entry at capacity-
constrained airports. Lastly, and importantly, the revenues generated by this approach could 
be utilized to fund capacity expansions when the benefits of these expansions outweigh the 
costs, as might be indicated, for instance, by the prices airlines bid for airport slots. 
 
While slot auctions, clearly defined property rights, secondary markets, capacity 
additions, and an end to special interest carve-outs can go a long way towards enhancing the 
efficiency of our air traffic system, they alone would not prevent airlines with an already large 
share of rights at particular airports from enhancing or maintaining their market power by, for 
example, purchasing too many of these scarce rights. Here, antitrust authorities would need to 
remain watchful; not to prevent large carriers from growing efficiently, but to ensure through 
the use of an analytical framework such as that used routinely to evaluate proposed mergers, 
that anti-competitive acquisitions in these markets would be prevented.  
 
Lastly, the proposal developed in this paper should further be applied to the allocation 
of operating authorizations for international service to countries with which the U.S. does not 
have an Open Skies Treaty. These authorizations, which come up on occasion, are currently 
awarded at the discretion of the FAA, again for free. As a result, during the regulatory 
proceedings to award the authorizations, airlines spend significant sums of money lobbying 
the FAA intensely to secure these highly valued rights, as evidenced by the recent proceeding 
for authorizations to China. Here as well, a simple market-based auction should be used to not 
only  determine which airline has the highest valued use for the authorization, but also to 
ensure that the FAA, and not lobbyists, collects the revenues from the allocation process.  
   14  
 
 
The use of market-based solutions to problems of airport capacity allocation  and 
airport delays is long overdue. Implementation of proposals along the lines of those laid out in 
this paper would contribute greatly to achieving this objective. 
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Appendix: Computing the Cost in Dollars of Flight Delays. 
 
Using the BTS delay statistics, we calculate the average number of hours of delay on 
every airport-pair segment tracked by the BTS data. Then, using the Origin and Destination 
Survey (DB1B),
32 we break down each itinerary into its “terminating segments.” For one-way 
passengers, this is the last coupon segment of the itinerary. Round-trip passengers have two 
terminating segments: the coupon segment before arriving at their destination airport and the 
coupon segment that returns them to their originating airports. For each airport-pair in the 
BTS data, we calculate the total number of passengers from DB1B who had terminating 
segments in the airport-pair. For the passengers on these segments, the effect of a delay is 
simple to interpret: a one hour delay means the passenger arrived, on average, one hour late to 
his destination airport or one hour late returning to his origination airport. Multiplying the 
                                                 
32 Because the survey is a 10% sample of passengers, we multiply the number of sampled passengers by ten.   16  
 
 
average delay by the total number of passengers yields the total number of hours passengers 
were delayed on that airport-pair. As a proxy for the value of time of passengers, we divided 
the average per capita income at the two endpoints of the segment by a forty-hour workweek 
to compute average hourly wage. The hourly wage was then multiplied by the passenger-




                                                 
33 These estimates are conservative in several respects: first, they do not take account of the costs of cancelled or 
diverted flights. Second, they include only the 4462 routes tracked in the BTS delay data. Third, they exclude the 
cost of missed connections.   